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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Troy Lamar Harrell appeals from the judgment and sentence entered 
upon his conviction for delivery of a controlled substance. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
While on felony probation for a prior burglary conviction, Harrell sold 
synthetic cannabis - advertised as "potpourri" - to an undercover police officer. 
(PSI, pp.2-3, 5, 8, 16-17; Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 4-5, 7, 25-
26.) He was charged by superceding indictment with delivery of a controlled 
substance. (R., pp.15-16.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Harrell pied guilty to 
the charge and the state dismissed additional controlled substance charges in a 
separate case. (R., pp.120-33; 2/13/13 Tr., p.4, L.6 - p.25, L.22.) Also pursuant 
to the agreement, the state was free to argue "the facts and criminal history as 
contained in the presentence investigation" but agreed to submit on the 
presentence investigator's recommendation as to the actual sentence to be 
imposed. (2/13/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-13; PSI, p.8.) 
In the presentence report, Harrell professed to have been unaware he 
was "committing a felony" by selling "Potpourri to the officer." (PSI, p.5.) In 
response, the prosecutor argued at sentencing that the facts and circumstances 
of the crime refuted Harrell's claims of ignorance. (3/25/13 Tr., p.15, L.17 - p.16, 
L.10.) Specifically, the prosecutor pointed out that Harrell and his wife sold the 
"potpourri" out of a store called "Smoke Effecx," and that "[w]hen you got to 
Smoke Effecx, there were marijuana posters and banners all over the place," as 
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well as "T-shirts with drug paraphernalia and marijuana slogans all over them," 
and "marijuana leaf-shaped ashtrays on the counter." (3/25/13 Tr., p.15, L.19 -
p.16, L.2.) The prosecutor further represented: "[T]hey sold spice. They sold 
drugs. They sold pipes. They were in the business of getting money, lots of 
money - approximately 25 to 29,000 was seized from them - by selling people 
... spice." (3/25/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-10; see also p.17, Ls.5-6 (prosecutor 
representing potpourri was "sold right next to the smoking pipes").) Defense 
counsel did not object to the prosecutor's factual representations, but he did 
respond to them in his own argument, stating: "While some of the things [the 
prosecutor] does bring up are factually correct, . . . . [f]or [sic] the best of my 
knowledge, there weren't any pipes that were sold in this particular 
establishment." (3/25/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.17-25.) Defense counsel's recollection of 
the facts is substantiated by the police reports attached to the presentence 
report, which indicate the only items for sale inside Smoke Effecx were several 
different brands of "potpourri." (Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 5, 7.) 
After considering the contents of the presentence report, including the 
attachments thereto (3/25/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-16, p.29, Ls.21-23, p.30, Ls.4-8), 
and listening to the arguments of counsel and Harrell's own statement in 
allocution (3/25/13 Tr., p.14, L.12 - p.28, L.24, p.29, L.21 - p.30, L.3), the district 
court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed (R., pp.154-




Harrell states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the state's erroneous assertion that the store sold pipes 
violate Mr. Harrell's right to due process? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion in imposing an 
excessive sentence? 
(Appellant's brief, p.3.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Harrell failed to show fundamental error entitling him to appellate 
review of his unpreserved claim that the state violated his due process 
rights at sentencing? 
2. Has Harrell failed to establish that the unified sentence of five years, with 
two years fixed, imposed upon his guilty plea to delivery of a controlled 




Harrell Has Failed To Demonstrate Fundamental Error Entitling Him To Appellate 
Review Of His Unpreserved Claim Of A Due Process Violation 
A. Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Harrell argues the prosecutor violated his due 
process rights by making a "materially untrue assertion" at sentencing. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.3-4.) This Court should decline to review Harrell's due 
process argument because he did not raise it below, and he has not even 
attempted to carry, much less succeeded in carrying, his appellate burden of 
establishing fundamental error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for 
appeal." State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Absent a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an 
alleged error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 227-28, 245 P.3d 961, 979-80 (2010). 
C. Harrell's Due Process Claim Is Not Properly Before This Court Because 
He Did Not Assert A Due Process Violation Below And He Has Failed On 
Appeal To Demonstrate Fundamental Error 
It is well-settled that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not 
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 
209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010) (citing State v. Johnson, 126 Idaho 892, 
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896, 894 P.2d 125, 129 (1995)). An exception to this rule exists if the alleged 
error constitutes fundamental error. Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976. 
However, the burden of demonstrating fundamental error rests squarely with the 
defendant asserting the error for the first time on appeal. .!sh at 228, 245 P.3d at 
980. To carry that burden, a defendant asserting an unpreserved error must 
demonstrate that the error he alleges "(1) violates one or more of [his] unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
.!sh Although the Perry opinion applied the fundamental error doctrine in the 
context of unpreserved trial errors, the Idaho Supreme Court has recently 
clarified that "ill! claims of unobjected-to error in criminal cases are now subject 
to the fundamental error test set forth in Perry." State v. Carter, 115 Idaho 170, 
_, 307 P.3d 187, 190 (2013) (emphasis added); see also id. at_, 307 P.3d 
at 191 (holding "the fundamental error test is the proper standard for determining 
whether an appellate court may hear claims based upon unobjected-to error in 
all phases of criminal proceedings in the trial courts of this state"). 
For the first time on appeal, Harrell argues the prosecutor violated his due 
process rights by making a "materially untrue" assertion at sentencing. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.3-4.) Specifically, he complains: 
[A]ccording to the documents attached to the PSI, law enforcement 
specifically noted that there were no pipes inside Smoke Effecx. 
Accordingly, the prosecutor's argument that Mr. Harrell sold was 
[sic] pipes was materially untrue. Because the prosecutor's 
comments were not made until the sentencing hearing and 
contradicted the information in the PSI, Mr. Harrell did not have a 
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full opportunity to rebut the state's false claim. Further, the state's 
untrue assertion harmed Mr. Harrell by undermining his explanation 
that he believed the store was operating within the law. 
The state's materially untrue assertion that Smoke Effecx 
sold pipes violated Mr. Harrell's right to due process. The case 
should therefore be remanded for re-sentencing. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4 (emphasis in original).) Harrell, however, did not object to 
the prosecutor's comments below and he certainly never claimed the 
prosecutor's factual misstatement violated his due process rights such that he 
was entitled to a new sentencing hearing. (See generally 3/25/13 Tr.) To the 
contrary, defense counsel below addressed the alleged misstatement head-on in 
his own sentencing argument, advising the court - consistent with the materials 
attached to the presentence report - that, to "the best of [his] knowledge, there 
weren't any pipes that were sold" at Smoke Effecx. (Compare 3/25/13 Tr., p.20, 
Ls.23-25 with Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 5, 7.) Having failed 
below to assert any due process violation resulting from the prosecutor's 
erroneous factual representation, and having failed on appeal to even argue, 
much less demonstrate fundamental error, Harrell has forfeited consideration of 
this issue on appeal. 
Even if this Court were to review Harrell's unpreserved claim of a due 
process violation for fundamental error, the claim would fail under all three 
prongs of Perry. The first two prongs of Perry require Harrell to demonstrate a 
clear violation of one of his unwaived constitutional rights. Perry, 150 Idaho at 
228, 245 P.3d at 980. The only constitutional right Harrell claims was violated by 
the prosecutor's erroneous assertion that, in addition to "potpourri," Smoke 
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Effecx also sold pipes was his due process right to have the sentencing court not 
rely upon information that was materially untrue or make materially false 
assumptions of fact. (See Appellant's brief, p.3 (citing State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 
170, 174, 90 P.3d 920, 924 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Dunn, 134 Idaho 165, 172, 
997 P.2d 626, 633 (Ct. App. 2000)). The record does not support Harrell's claim 
of a due process violation, however, because there is no indication that the court 
actually relied on the prosecutor's erroneous factual statement in imposing 
Harrell's sentence and Harrell's defense counsel actually corrected the 
misstatement before sentence was imposed. 
It is well settled that, to minimize the likelihood of due process violations at 
sentencing, the reliability of the information upon which the court relies must be 
insured by the defendant's opportunity to present favorable evidence, to examine 
all the materials and to explain or rebut adverse evidence. State v. Campbell, 
123 Idaho 922, 854 P.2d 265 (Ct. App. 1993); Cunningham v. State, 117 Idaho 
428, 788 P.2d 243 (Ct. App. 1990). In this case, Harrell not only had the 
opportunity to present favorable evidence and to rebut the prosecutor's 
erroneous factual statement, his defense counsel actually seized that opportunity 
by pointing out to the court that, to "the best of [his] knowledge, there weren't any 
pipes that were sold" at Smoke Effecx. (3/25/13 Tr., p.20, Ls.23-25.) Defense 
counsel's recollection of the facts was entirely consistent with the facts set forth 
in the presentence report and the police reports attached thereto, all of which the 
district court indicated it had "carefully reviewed" before imposing Harrell's 
sentence. (3/25/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-14; see also p.29, Ls.21-23, p.30, Ls.4-8.) 
7 
Because Harrell had the opportunity to examine the presentence materials and 
to rebut and explain the prosecutor's erroneous factual assertion, and because 
there is no indication in the record that the court actually relied on the 
prosecutor's erroneous assertion in imposing sentence, Harrell cannot 
demonstrate any clear violation of his due process rights. 
Harrell's unpreserved claim of a due process violation also fails under the 
third prong of Perry, which requires Harrell to demonstrate he was actually 
prejudiced by the prosecutor's erroneous factual assertion. Perry, 150 Idaho at 
228, 245 P.3d at 980. Harrell argues the misstatement that Smoke Effecx sold 
pipes "harmed [him]" because it "undermin[ed] his explanation that he believed 
the store was operating within the law." (Appellant's brief, p.4.) Harrell's claim of 
prejudice fails for the reasons already discussed - i.e., there is no indication in 
the record that the court relied on the prosecutor's misstatement in imposing 
sentence, defense counsel corrected the misstatement in his own argument, and 
defense counsel's recollection of the facts was supported by the presentence 
materials, all of which the sentencing court stated it had "carefully reviewed." It 
also fails because the presentence materials reviewed by the court contained 
multiple other indications that Harrell knew what he was doing - selling synthetic 
cannabis labeled as "potpourri" out of a retail store - was illegal. 
According to the police reports, the only products Harrell and his wife sold 
out of their business were several different brands of "potpourri." (Bates 
Stamped Attachments to PSI, pp.1, 5, 7.) Although there were signs in the store 
warning customers not to say words like "weed," "marijuana," "smoke," "pipe," 
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etc., and the "potpourri" was labeled "not 4 human consumption," the business 
itself was called Smoke Effecx. (Id.) In addition, both the prosecutor and 
defense counsel represented there were marijuana-themed "T-shirts and other 
things of that nature" present inside the store. (3/25/13 Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, 
L.2, p.20, Ls.17-20.) When officers executed a search warrant on Smoke Effecx 
they recovered "approximately 500 separate packages of different brand names 
of potpourri" and nearly $26,000 in cash. (Bates Stamped Attachments to PSI, 
p.1.) 
Focusing on the information actually contained in the presentence 
materials, the district court found Harrell's protestations of ignorance highly 
suspect, stating: 
The reality is he was selling something in a shop that he knew -
despite paying lip service to other things, knew that people would 
be taking out and smoking to get high. It's not realistic to think that 
he was actually selling something that he thought that they would 
take home and put in a dish and smell, especially for the prices that 
they were obtaining. 
(3/25/13 Tr., p.31, Ls.16-24.) Given the wealth of factually accurate information 
that tended to show Harrell knew what he was doing was illegal, there is no 
reasonable possibility that the prosecutor's erroneous assertion that Smoke 
Effecx also sold pipes affected the court's assessment of Harrell's credibility or 
that it caused the court to impose a harsher sentence than it otherwise would 
have had the misstatement not been made. Harrell's unpreserved claim of a due 
process violation thus fails under all three prongs of Perry and is not reviewable 
as fundamental error. 
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II. 
Harrell Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Harrell challenges the unified sentence of five years, with two years fixed, 
imposed upon his conviction for delivering a controlled substance. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.4-5.) A review of the record supports the sentence imposed. Harrell 
has failed to establish the sentencing court abused its discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. !s;l 
C. Harrell Has Failed To Show His Sentence Is Excessive Under Any 
Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. !s;l 
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"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness." 
State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834, 264 P.3d 935, 941 (2011) (quotations and 
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court 
will make an independent examination of the record, "having regard to the nature 
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public 
interest." 19.:. Contrary to Harrell's arguments on appeal, an examination of the 
record in this case shows his sentence is reasonable. 
Harrell's criminal record occupies nearly eleven full pages of the PSI and 
includes eight juvenile adjudications, at least 22 misdemeanor convictions and 
one prior felony conviction (for burglary). (PSI, pp.5-16, 19.) He has served 
numerous jail terms, has had the benefit of rehabilitative programming during a 
period of retained jurisdiction, and has been afforded multiple opportunities on 
probation. (PSI, pp.7-17.) Despite these prior legal sanctions and rehabilitative 
efforts, Harrell has demonstrated an unyielding inability or unwillingness to live a 
law-abiding life. He repeatedly violated the terms of his probations by 
committing new crimes and, in fact, was on probation for burglary when he 
committed the controlled substance charge of which he was convicted in this 
case. (PSI, pp.16-17.) 
In fashioning an appropriate sentence, the district court specifically 
considered the goals of sentencing, including "[f]irst and foremost" the need to 
protect society. (3/25/13 Tr., p.29, Ls.14-21.) The court considered Harrell's 
lengthy criminal record and his history of repeated failures to abide by the terms 
and conditions of probation. (3/25/13 Tr., p.30, L.8 - p.31, L.10, p.33, L.16 -
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p.34, L.5.) The court also considered Harrell's claim that he did not know the 
"potpourri" he sold to the undercover officer in this case was a controlled 
substance but specifically found that claim "not credible." (3/25/13 Tr., p.31, 
Ls.11-24, p.32, L.23 - p.33, L.4.) The court was particularly concerned that, 
while on felony probation, Harrell was engaged in what, at best, was "clearly a 
fringe business on the fringe of legality or illegality, potentially harmful to people, 
knowing that he had [addiction] issues himself." (3/25/13 Tr., p.31, L.25 - p.32, 
L.22.) Given the nature of the crime, Harrell's criminal history and his prior 
multiple failed attempts at probation, the district court determined that a sentence 
of incarceration with a "relatively short fixed [two-year] term" was not only 
warranted, but necessary both to "allow[] the board of corrections flexibility in 
placing [Harrell] in a rehabilitative program" and to enable Harrell to "obtain the 
tools while he's in custody to make better decisions and be a productive member 
of the community and society." (3/25/13 Tr., p.36, Ls.4-20.) 
On appeal, Harrell does not contest any of the information in the 
presentence materials or the district court's factual findings. Instead, he claims 
only that the court should have given greater weight to factors he deems 
mitigating, including his relatively young age and previously diagnosed learning 
disabilities. (Appellant's brief, pp.1, 4-5.) There can be no question that the 
district court, having "carefully reviewed" the contents of the presentence report, 
was aware of these "mitigating factors" when it imposed Harrell's sentence. (See 
3/25/13 Tr., p.11, Ls.12-16.) That the court did not assign these factors greater 
weight or elevate them above the need to protect society while at the same time 
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providing Harrell an opportunity for structured rehabilitation does not show the 
sentence is excessive. Harrell has failed to show an abuse of sentencing 
discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence. 
DATED this 15th day of May 2014. 
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